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INTRODUCTION
Superficially, the boundaries marking off the civil section
of the law from the criminal division, seem to be dearly de-
fined, the one readily distinguishable from the other. In point
of fact, however, there is in many instances an overlapping and
dovetailing, a blending of the categories, so to say. This gives
rise to the necessity for subjecting to careful scrutiny the frame-
work of actions that partake of both a criminal and a civil
nature.
Now the objective in the civil forum is basically to make
the aggrieved party whole. In the criminal court, the goals
may be variously stated, though en rapport: first, to punish
the offender against societyi' secondly, to deter him and other
from perpetrating similar, or any, offenses against society; and
thirdly, to inspirit in the offender an approach to penitence
for his wrongful act.2  Yet an examination discloses that, to
a not inconsiderable extent, the civil tribunal acts as a supple-
menting, bolstering factor, to secure the objectives of the crim-
inal forum.
The subject of punitive damages, indiscriminately referred
to in the reported cases as exemplary, punitory, vindictive or
imaginary damages, or smart money,' furnishes a choice ex-
lIt is the interest of society which is stressed in a criminal action; and the state
in its sovereign capacity is always plaintiff.
" The etymological aspects of incarceration in a "penitentiary" are obvious.
a See Fay vs. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1870), opinion per Foster,
J. This classic case is illuminating on the entire subject, and can be studied with profit.
The authorities are extensively reviewed and weighed. At p. z86, the court says:
S. .. . it is interesting as well as instructive to observe that one hun-
dred and twenty years ago (that is, circa 1753) the term smart money was
employed in a manner entirely different from the modem signification which
it has obtained, being then used as indicating compensation for the smarts of
the injured person, and not, as now, money required by way of punishment,
and to make the wrong-doer smart (citing from Rutherford's translation of
Grotius.1,
It should be said that the various expressions embracing the concept of "punitive"
damages are used in this paper interchangeably (Fay vs. Parker, supra, at p. 27).
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ample. If one asks what is the rationale underlying the award
of such damages in cases of malicious prosecution, false im-
prisonment, slander, libel, assault and battery, and the like,
the very designation "punitive" furnishes a material clue. And
if we are forced to conclude that the objective is truly to punish
the offender by the assessment of damages over and above
that which will make the complainant whole, is not the of-
fender, in effect, being fined in a civil action?
THEORIES SUPPORTING AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In the early English cases wherein the doctrine had its
genesis, the courts took the position that, the litigants having
made an issue to the country, they had left solely within the
province of the jury to determine whether or not the plaintiff
ought to recover, and if so, in what amount. Having done
this, the courts reasoned, the defendant could not with pro-
priety question the award. Thus, at that time, the courts did
not deem it necessary to give extensive consideration to the
premise, because of this convenient rule: that the courts would
not disturb a jury verdict on an award of damages.'
Today this is not the case, of course, and we naturally find
that other bases must obtain for permitting an award of
punitive damages.
Various theories have been expounded for allowing such
an award. One concerns itself with the broad aspects of public
policy. The courts adhering to this proposition will point out
that the jury may assess exemplary damages (in a proper case,
to be sure), to punish the offender, and to deter him and others
from perpetrating acts similar to those forming the gravamen
of the action.
Thus, in an early Ohio case, the court, placing emphasis
on the matter of punishment, says, in the course of its opinion:
4 Huckle vs. Money, z Wils. K.B. 2oS, 95 Eng. Rep. R. 768, (1763)i Russel vs.
Palmer, 2 Wils. K.B. 3z2, 95 Eng. Rep. R. 837 (1767). And see generally, Sedgwick
on Damages (9sz---gth Ed.) Vol. I, pp. 687-689.
Cf. Roy vs. Duke of Beaufort, z Atk. 191, z6 Eng. Rep. R. Sig, Szo (174'),
where the court says:
. . ... nor was there any notice taken of killing the Duke's dog,
and, however trifling it may be called, if such a thing came before me at nisi
prius, on the insolent behaviour of the person at the time he shot the dog, and
other circumstance, I should have made no scruple of directing very considerable
damages."
It is interesting to note that dogs were not the subject of larceny at the common
law. Ohio vs. Lymus, 26 Ohio St. 400, 4.02 (875).
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The principle of permitting damages in certain cases, to go beyond
naked compensation, is for example, and the punishment of the guilty
party for the wicked, corrupt and malignant motive and design, which
prompted him to do the wrongful act.'
The advocates of this tenet must be prepared to follow its
implications to their logical conclusion: that in instances where
the allotment of punitive damages is a proper issue, the civil
branch of the law acts to secure, more or less, the objectives
of the criminal tribunal.
Another theory upon which has been predicated the feasi-
bility of allowing vindictive damages in certain cases is that of
additional compensation to the injured party. So, it has been
observed that the idea of punishment is not the goal in such
cases, but rather an increased assessment of damages because
of the supposed aggravation of the injury to the sensibilities
of the complainant, by virtue of the wanton or reckless acts of
the offender.6
Sometimes an attempt is made to blend the two theories,
and as illustrative of the confusion resulting when this is done,
the statement of the court in Sess vs. Marinari is peculiarly
apropos:
Punitive damages should not be awarded in any case where the
amount of compensatory damages is adequate to punish the defendant,
but only where they are insufficient for that purpose.7
Still another hypothesis has its roots in the observation that
there is a certain middle ground embracing cases which have
criminal aspects, but for which there is no appropriate punitive
device in the criminal forum. Hence the civil agency must
assume this task, it being to the public interest that the com-
plainant be sued civilly. With this pragmatic theory, if it may
be so designated, as its bulwark, the court, in Hopkins vs. R.R.,
by Perley, C.J., observes that the recovery of exemplary dam-
ages in certain specific types of cases "is perhaps in accordance
with the legislative policy which has given pecuniary penalties
SSimpson vs. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio. So8, at 57z (1844). And see Western Union
Telegraph Co. vs. Smith, 64 Ohio St. io6, at z16, 59 N.E. 890 (19o).
a Brause vs. Brause, 19o Ia. 329, 177 N.W. 65, at 70 (592o), in which case the
exposition of this theory appears. And cf. Wise vs. Daniel, zzi Mich. 229, x9o N.W.
746 (igzz2.
7 94 S.E. 968, 81 W. Va. Soo (1918).
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in numerous instances to private prosecutors of certain of-
fenses."'
While it is undoubtedly true that in certain classifications
offenses relating to gaming being a ready-to-hand example,'
the legislature has seen fit to reward the prosecuting witness,
it is submitted that this can hardly be treated as a credible
basis for permitting an award of punitive damages. Especially
is this so when it is borne in mind that the early development
of the rule had no connection with such acts of legislative
bodies. In fact, the reverse may well be true; namely, that
such legislative enactments had their inception in the judicial
attitude already formulated and crystallized.
In any event, this theory is certainly not all-inclusive, and
cannot possibly relate to those cases where the offender may
face an assessment of punitive damages, even though he must
answer in the criminal forum as to the same fact configuration.
This situation is of relatively frequent occurrence, and in the
many jurisdictions where the act of the offender may make
for both a civil and a criminal action, it must be obvious that
the civil agency becomes the forum for the affixing of penalties
more in keeping with the functions of the criminal court, re-
gardless of what theory is employed to justify the recovery.
On occasion it is intimated that, even if there is no prop
to support the rule, it having been clothed with the sanctity
of the ages, it should be applied, and its operation perforce can
not be open to question.10
s 36 N. H. 9 (857). The court continues:
"Where the wrong done to the party partakes of a criminal character,
though not punishable as an offence against the State, the public may be said to
have an interest that the wrong doer should be prosecuted and brought to jus-
tice in a civil suit; and exemplary damages may in such cases encourage
prosecutions where a mere compensation for the private injury would not repay
the trouble and expense of the proceeding."
The case is approved, and the above excerpt quoted by the court in Rwy. vs. Dunn,
ag Ohio St. a6z, at 17z (1869). In Fay vs. Parker, a later New Hampshire decision,
note 4, supra, the opinion is carefully analyzed by Foster, J., and its limits defined.
The Parker case, decided after the Hopkins case, repudiated the doctrine of punitive
damaVes.
See Ohio Gen. Code (Throck. 1934) secs. 5969, 59701 Cooper vs. Rowley, z9
Ohio St. 547 (1876).
't Day vs. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371, 14 L. Ed. x$1 (a84x). The opinion
is commented upon by Sedgwick, note 3, supra, at p. 697, and at p. 700, the writer of
this valuable treatise says:
"TJpon the whole, the doctrine is to be supported (except in those few
jurisdictions which have repudiated it) mainly upon the grounds of authority
and convenience."
See, also, Daugherty vs. Shoun, 48 Tenn. (i Helsk.) 302 (870).
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It is suggested by the writer that, possibly allied to some
of the other theories propounded by the courts, there was
another basis for permitting such an award, though not alluded
to in the reported cases. In this connection, let us tabulate
the various felonies differentiated from each other at an early
day. Fundamentally, there were seven: murder, manslaughter,
rape, arson, burglary, larceny and robbery. Whether or not
these offenses related to the person, to property, or to both, in
the event of a verdict of guilty being returned by the jury,
capital punishment was the portion of the offender. But even
for comparatively minor offenses against property, the punish-
ment, judged by modern standards at least, was unusually
severe. 1 This did not obtain as regarded minor offenses against
the person. So, to rationalize a recovery by way of punitive
damages, the judges passing on the question may well have
been influenced by the consideration that the punishment in the
criminal forum in relation to minor offenses against the person
was not severe enough, when compared to the punishment
meted out for minor offenses against property, although attend-
ing major offenses, whether against the person or property,
there was dealt out the same degree of punishment. Accord-
ingly, it would follow that the civil forum should be invoked,
in proper cases, to act as a punitive agency, and fitly enough,
to make a better balance. In other words, here would be the
desideratum for effecting a practical synthesis of the civil and
criminal agencies, though their functions be admittedly differ-
entiated as to method and objective, in the first instance.
Such a suggestion appears to be plausible, when it is noted
that, in the main, it is offenses against the person which are
proper subject-matter for the allowance of punitive damages.
OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE
Of more than academic significance is the problem in its
entirety, when it becomes apparent that, in civil cases where
the allotment of exemplary damages is an issue, elements are
present which may be more properly referable to the criminal
" In connection with this observation, see Rex. vs. Jones, 4 Car. & P. 217, 172
Eng. Rep. R. 677 (x830). Sometimes, technical considerations as to property offenses
were invoked in favor of the accused, presumably because of the severe punishment
entailed. See Rex vs. Birdseye, 4 Car. & P. 386, 172 Eng. Rep. R. 751 (1830); Rex
vs. Birket, 4 Car. & P. z16l 17z Eng. Rep. R. 676 (183o). The three cases, collectively
weighed, afford a stimulating study.
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forum. Assume, for example, that the civil suit is being tried
in a jurisdiction, such as Ohio, where three-fourths of the
jurors may concur in returning a verdict. 2 In a criminal pro-
ceeding, all the jurors must agree;" yet, in the civil forum,
in such cases, a jury of less than twelve may act to inflict a
penalty, by way of punishment (if the "punishment" theory
be regarded as tenable).
Other objections have been urged. One is that, from the
evidentiary standpoint, the defendant, charged with crime,
must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; in a civil
case, a preponderance of the evidence suffices.
Another is that, in a civil suit, the defendant may be com-
pelled to testify against himself, whereas in a criminal action,
his testimony must be offered voluntarily.' And more objec-
tions along these lines will suggest themselves.
From these, the consequence is unavoidable that, in many
instances, to secure an objective identical in theory, and some-
times in practical effect, with that of the criminal agency, in-
strumentalities are utilized that do not secure to the defendant
the safeguards which encloak him in the criminal tribunal.
Accordingly, in these cases, he stands in the civil forum stripped
of the protective aegis which is his for the asking in the criminal
court.
Mention should also be made of another disturbing factor;
namely, that the jurors have no guide or norm in assessing
damages which transcend such as will make the aggrieved party
whole. Where the question is one of compensation, appropriate
measuring-sticks are available. But in cases where the allot-
ment of vindictive damages is an issue, these gauges are ab-
sent, and if the verdict is deemed so excessive as to presuppose
that the jury acted from considerations of passion or preju-
dice, 5 the entire mold is colored by the fact that the case is a
proper one for the allowance of punitive damages, and there-
fore calculated to prejudice and arouse the passions of the jury.
12 Ohio Const. Art. I, sec. 5. Ohio Gen. Code (Throck. 1934.) secs. 10350-10351.
's Ohio Const. Art. I, sec. so.
" Aid. It will be noted, however, that in Ohio, in the event the prisoner does not
testify, "his failure to testify may be considered by the court and jury and may be made
the subject of comment of counsel."
"~in which event the court could grant a new trial in Ohio. Ohio Gen. Code
(Throck. 1934) sec. 11576, subsec. 4.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, it has not been possible to do more than call
attention to the necessity for a reexamination of the doctrine
in the light of its historical buttresses, its development, and
its modern setting. If it is deemed essential by the courts to
find some underlying premise which will logically justify such
an award, the theory should be one which will not distort the
primary functions of the civil tribunal. True it is, however,
that the logical conclusion may not be correct, and may, if not
tempered in the fires of ultimate justice, warp the fundamental
purpose of the court.
But whether or not from the standpoint of expediency, or
in practical effect, it is desirable for the civil court to inflict
penalties or otherwise act to supplement the basal objectives
of the criminal forum, is a serious question, not to be passed
upon lightly.
It is suggested, therefore, that the problem ought to evoke
careful study and analysis, in its many ramifications.
County Home Rule in Ohio
By HARVEY WALKER
Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University
On November 7, 1933 the voters of Ohio approved an
amendment to the state constitution which conferred upon
counties in the state many of the powers of local self govern-
ment which cities have enjoyed in this state since September
1912. This amendment was in form a new Article X, the
former Article X being wholly repealed. The old article had
prevented reform in county government by requiring that all
county officers be elected, by limiting terms of office and by
requiring that all counties be governed by general state law.
The new article contemplates three possible bases for county
government: (I) general law, (2) optional law, and (3)
home rule charter. Officers may be appointed rather than
elected if that is desired and terms of office can be provided by
the law or charter without any constitutional limits.
